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Abstract. Security and safety applications of Vehicular Ad
hoc Networks (VANETs) are developed to improve the traffic
flow. While safety applications in VANETs provide warnings
and information for the vehicle and other units in the area,
malicious behaviors can render this very purpose meaning-
less. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are key features
for identifying the presence of faulty or malicious behav-
iors. Support Vector Machine (SVM) is an efficient tool for
anomaly detection and it can be employed for intrusion de-
tection based on the metrics of a known attack or normal
behavior. Dropping and or delaying network packets are
two of the most common variants among other methods in
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Hence an IDS which can
detect both variants can detect similar types of DoS attacks.
The result of the study is obtained by designing and imple-
menting an SVM detection module into computer-generated
simulation, which depicts a successful outcome in detection
of mentioned DoS attack variants.
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1. Introduction
An essential role of Vehicular Ad hoc Networks
(VANETs) is providing critical information regarding the
safety of the traffic. These applications use the available
wireless network for gathering or sharing vital information
from, or to other vehicles, which is known as Vehicle-to-
Vehicle (V2V), as well as roadside units that are referred to
as Vehicle-to-Infrastructures (V2I). There are both periodic
and on-demandmessages exchanged with other units in order
to keep the application functional. The ability to receive and
transmit these messages on time is crucial, especially in case
of emergency.
VANET is a subcategory of Mobile Ad hoc Networks
(MANETs), specialized for vehicular environments. This
means it is inherently benefitting from the flexibility and
unique features ofMANETswhile also sufferingmainly from
its security issues. On the other hand, vehicular environment
brings additionally unique characteristics to the network; pre-
dictable movements, almost no restraint in power consump-
tion and more rapid change in the network topology are some
examples [1]. The Onboard Unit (OBU) of a VANET node
or vehicle utilizes short-range wireless communication using
IEEE 802.11p standard, along with suitable routing proto-
cols. The decision for choosing a proper routing algorithm is
itself a separate topic, which is debated briefly or thoroughly
in various papers [2–4]. Moreover, Ad hoc On Demand Dis-
tance Vector (AODV) and other routing protocols that are
generally common in MANETs are still viable in VANETs
[4].
Wireless networks, unlike their wired counterpart, have
the vulnerability of being accessible to any attacker that hap-
pens to be in the coverage area. This is a substantial issue
in VANETs as well. Although being susceptible to various
types of intrusions, having far less power constraint issues
means more flexibility in using the computational power of
the OBU. This makes room for using machine-learning al-
gorithms such as Support Vector Machine (SVM) more ef-
fectively. What makes SVM a suitable choice for this type
of intrusion detection is its strong pattern recognition and
the ability to transform non-linearly separable data mapped
into linearly separable space. SVM is also one of the best
methods used in binary classification or anomaly detection.
It is also efficient in terms of training and classification time
in comparison to methods such as deep learning [5].
Different types of network intrusions carry on different
forms and purposes; Denial of Service (DoS) attacks belong
to a group of intrusions which target the availability of a net-
work resource by various methods. Two of the commonly
used methods in these kinds of attacks are dropping and
delaying network packets. However, there are many other
variants of DoS attacks such as flooding attack which tries
to bottleneck the available network bandwidth of the target
with junk data. The combined properties of DoS attacks and
VANETs create new challenges for tracking the presence of
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such anomalies in the network. The following objectives are
the main contribution of this paper:
• We investigated and the required feature space for packet
dropping and delaying typeDoS attack detection specif-
ically for the receiving end of a VANET connection.
• Weused state of the art computer simulation for generat-
ing vehicular traffic environment with realistic mobility
patterns to generate normal and malicious datasets as
well as evaluating the final IDS.
• Using the selected features in the data gathering module
of our proposed IDS to train an SVM-based anomaly
detection system for VANETs.
After designing and implementing our proposed IDS
we compared its performance to other similar methods. The
comparison result shows notable improvement over the other
classifiers. To establish a robust method against the men-
tioned type of DoS attacks, we studied the effect of random
packet delays and drops in a generic VANET scenario using
computer simulation. Afterward, we selected and studied the
effect of the most important parameters that we believed are
necessary to identify the presence of intruders in the network.
In this study the receiving vehicle examines the packet
arrival pattern to detect traces of intrusion in the network.
Previously we have studied possibility of intrusion detection
on the intermediate vehicles [6], this method, while it is vi-
able puts extra strain in terms of calculation overhead on
every packet forwarding vehicles which can be exhaustive
in overcrowded situations. Current study is focused on run-
ning the intrusion detection task on the target vehicle which
in turn reduces the extra resource consumption on the other
vehicles. This also means that we require an update for the
data gathering module as well as the detection module. The
details of the feature selection related to the data gathering
module, training of the detection module, and, the simulation
environment are explained further in the coming sections.
As we continue, in this paper, we discuss other related
works on this issue in Sec. 2, then describe the nature of the
problem and both its common and unique specifications in
Sec. 3. In Sec. 4, we present the details of the proposed SVM
Intrusion Detection Module (IDM) design, followed by its
performance analysis in various situations with a compari-
son to other detection systems in Sec. 5 and finally, in Sec. 6,
make our conclusion and discuss future works.
2. Related Work
Security of VANETs is a point of discussion in many
computer science journals. Some of the most common se-
curity attacks in VANETs are mentioned by Kolandaisamy
et al. [7]. Their solution to particularly Distributed DoS
(DDoS) attack is to first create a reputation-based system
for selecting cluster heads for network routing. Then, the
cluster heads will use the proposed Stream Position Perfor-
mance Analysis to rate the trustworthiness of the data flow
coming from other vehicles. Another research by Zhou et al.
[8] suggests another reputation-based system using a method
called distributed collaborative intrusion detection system of
the VANET. This method is an invariant-based anomaly de-
tection that analyzes the behavior of vehicles as well as traffic
and communication flow to identify malicious nodes.
A paper by Basant Subba et al. [9] demonstrates an In-
trusion Detection System (IDS) based on game theory. The
intrusion detection runs in three layers; immediate neighbor
level, cluster level, and RSU level. To minimize the network
overhead, the researchers used two players non-cooperative
game between any two vehicles to detect malicious behav-
ior. The system can detect intrusions with higher accuracy
when the number of agents increases in the cluster, however,
the false alarm ratio will also increase by introducing more
agents. Similarly, Muhammad Mohsin Mehdi et al. [10]
proposes a trust model based on game theory for VANETs,
which tags nodes as a defender or attacker to determine the
safest path available for routing. It shows better performance
in a higher density of defender nodes and performs better in
longer duration of established connections.
Khattab et al. [11] proposed an intrusion detection for
identifying and mitigating DoS attacks in VANET by us-
ing discriminant analysis methods. Their proposed system
requires fuzzification for pre-processing data to reduce the
ambiguity of malicious and non-malicious inputs. Their uti-
lized classifiers are Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and
Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA). The researchers ob-
tained high classification ratio with good precision, recall and
F-Score. However, the IDS is dependent on a special data
pre-processing to be effective.
G. Kumaresan et al. [12], have introduced a group key
authentication scheme for security in VANETs by authenti-
cation in a cluster-based network. In this scheme, a cluster
head acts as an authenticator for the safety of the packets
targeting any cluster member. In another paper by Hichem
Sedjelmaci et al. [13], which also considers cluster forma-
tion, the authors employ collaborative intrusion detection to
form a stable cluster with the most trusted node as its head. In
another paper, Lee and Jeong proposed a black hole detection
method based on mutual authentication scheme in VANET
[14]. This method requires authenticating nodes in the area
to be effective that makes it more similar to an infrastructure
network.
Neeraj Kumar et al. [15] proposed a collaborative trust
aware IDS, based on information from the different states of
the nodes in the area. The authors used the Markov Chain
Model for state transitions and collaborative trust index for
generating intrusion alerts. Their system shows about 90%
success rate. Gisung Kim et al. proposed a method [16],
which uses the C4.5 algorithm for misuse detection to en-
hance a one-class SVM for pattern recognition. The authors
depicted an increase in the performance and reduced time of
detection for known attacks, while also noting that the train-
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ing and testing time is lower than the conventional methods.
Another SVM-based IDS is proposed in [6], which is focused
on trust value for every vehicle based on the response from
the detection module.
A new approach for intrusion detection in VANET is
proposed by Tao Zhang and Quanyan Zhu [17]. In this ap-
proach, the authors designed a collaborative intrusion detec-
tion system that is also focused on keeping the privacy of the
users. The classifiers in this IDS are trained in a decentralized
manner to detect malicious vehicles. The authors presented
effective methods to minimize the empirical risk related to
the privacy of the vehicles in VANET. Data fusion is a pro-
cess of collecting data from heterogeneous environments,
which is a technique used by Uzma Khan et al. [18]. The
authors designed an IDS which utilizes information coming
from different layers of wireless networks to demonstrate its
effectiveness compared to single parameter utilization.
More comprehensive studies of known intrusions in
VANET, alongside surveys of different detection methods
are available in review articles by various authors [19–24].
3. Problem Definition
To address the main concern of this research in more
details, we will be discussing the concept of the problem
alongside its characteristics and effects in VANET environ-
ments.
Self-organization is one of the main aspects of any ad
hoc network and highly depends on routing protocols, which
use cooperative path discovery for establishing connections,
and VANETs are no exception. This implies that any device
with VANET capability can participate in sending, receiving
and forwarding data packets in its coverage area. Since ad
hoc networks are not moderated by a central infrastructure,
as mentioned in the introduction, any malicious or defective
network node can affect other nodes in its wireless cover-
age area. There are varieties of security attacks present in
VANET, each targeting a vital functionality of the network.
Confidentiality, integrity and availability are threemain func-
tionalities which are targeted in DoS attacks [22].
Fig. 1. An arbitrary VANET scenario.
Generally, DoS and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks
target availability and integrity of the victim. For instance,
Jellyfish (JF) attack [25] is a DoS type attack that takes ad-
vantage of an ongoing path discovery process in the network
to become a Packet Forwarding Node (PFN) and sabotage
the connection. For these kinds of attacks, it is important
for the malicious node to become part of the packet forward-
ing route, hence, usually, the attacker is going to perform
Rushing Attack [26] in advance to have a higher chance of
being selected as a legitimate PFN. When it is selected as
a PFN, then one of the three variants of JF attack can be the
case here: periodic drop attack, delaying attack and packet
reorder attack [25]. Figure 1 illustrates a VANET scenario
with a possible malicious node in the area. In this figure, it is
assumed that vehicle A is trying to send a message to vehicle
C, which is out of its coverage area and needs vehicle B as
a PFN. If vehicle B is an attacker, then vehicle C is going to
either miss random or all packets from the intended message
or receive it with considerable delay. The immediate effect
of this type of attack will be reduced packet delivery ratio and
increased end-to-end delay. This is a critical issue in VANET
when it comes to safety and emergency applications. What
makes such types of attacks difficult to detect is their possible
periodic behavior, which means at random periods, they are
acting exactly as other legitimate nodes. This will help them
stay low profile in comparison to attackers that aggressively
and consistently affect the performance of a network. There-
fore, periodic attackers are able to stay hidden and undetected
in various situations.
In this paper, we concentrate on the described types of
attack to design an SVM IDM that is able to identify peri-
odic drop and delaying DoS attacks by analyzing the attack
pattern on the receiving node. The key to this solution is
to find distinctive patterns that appear in presence of an at-
tack, that would help create a well-defined support vector for
the best possible classification according to our data inputs.
Moreover, since this IDM can detect periodic random packet
drops, it can theoretically be able to detect similar types of
intrusions that affect packet delivery, such as grey-hole attack
[27].
4. SVM Intrusion Detection Module
Any type of IDS generally consists of three different
modules, namely, gathering module, detection module and
response module [26]. The role of the detection module is
identifying the presence of attack and initiating proper alert
for the response module. In our proposed IDM, we selected
SVM as the classifying algorithm. SVMwhich is also known
as Support Vector Networks has its performance known to be
excellent in two-class or binary data classification [28, 29].
4.1 Feature Space
Although SVM is a powerful tool, it is highly dependent
on feature selection for the best-drawn support vector. For se-
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lecting proper inputs, it is necessary to look at the behavior of
the network under attack and in normal state. For instance, in
the presence of a malicious node that targets the availability
of the network, there are higher number of packet-drops and
increased end-to-end delay. Also, for a scenario where the
receiving vehicle is analyzing the incoming data, the number
of forwarding vehicles between the source and the destination
which is known as hop-count can be an additional hint for
malicious behavior. It is clear that in a direct communication
when the hop-count is defined as 1, there is zero chance of
having an attacker that is trying to delay or drop an incoming
packet, although more than two hop-counts mean that there
are PFNs in between that can potentially be malicious nodes.
Although more features in machine learning methods
can help increasing the accuracy of the system, it will also
increase the complexity and classification time. Therefore,
we started creating our dataset based on the three mentioned
features which proved to be enough for our task. All three
parameters are calculated as the average value in one second
interval, which we used as training data for our SVM IDM
by the following procedure.
4.2 The Dataset
We obtained our training and testing dataset by build-
ing a computer-generated simulation of the VANET envi-
ronment. We used a combination of Network Simulator 2
(NS-2) [30], and, MOVE (MObility model generator for VE-
hicular networks) [31] together with micro-traffic simulator
SUMO [32] for simulating the VANET connectivity, and,
vehicle mobility in a predefined roadmap respectively. We
collected the dataset in real-time during the simulation with
the following setup.
Our training scenario involves 10 VANET nodes or ve-
hicles with the configuration that is given in Tab. 1. Only
one connection established between two vehicles for normal
dataset without attack, and formalicious dataset a single vehi-
cle from the remaining pool selected as themalicious vehicle.
The attacker starts its malicious behavior by rushing attack
during the path discovery process. This helps the attacker to
have a higher chance of being in the packet forwarding route.
Parameters Values
Simulation Area 1000 × 1000 m2
Mac Protocol IEEE 802.11p
Routing Protocol AODV
Simulation Time 1000 s
Number of Vehicles 10 / 30 / 50
Vehicle placement / Movement RandomStart / Destination Road(generated by SUMO)
Vehicle Speed 0 Km/h to 50 Km/h
Traffic Model Constant Bit Rate (CBR)
Traffic Rate 64 Kbps
Packet Size 512 B
Random Noise in CBR Disabled
Tab. 1. Simulation Parameters (NS-2, SUMO).
Following a successful rushing attack, the malicious
vehicle starts to periodically drops or delays the incoming
packets. The delays are between 200 milliseconds to 1 sec-
ond; this enables the attacker to cover its presence and stay
indistinct. After running the simulations, we collected the
normal and malicious datasets containing the average drop
rate, average end-to-end delay, and, average hop-counts. We
eliminated the first 200 seconds of simulation to ensure the
traffic and data flow are established.
We split the dataset into training and test datasets by
choosing the latter to be 25% of the collected pool of 800
samples. This test data is used only for evaluating the trained
IDM and is not taken into account for the final evaluation. It
is worth noting that the training data may seem small, how-
ever, our performance analysis shows that the SVM IDM can
generalize the intrusion patterns very well on the collected
dataset. We carried out the performance analysis in real-time
simulations with 15 different scenarios (see Tab. 2) each of
which has 50 different mobility patterns. Hence, a total of
750 simulations are run for the final evaluation.
4.3 Training the SVM IDM
For the SVM itself, like any other machine learning
technique requires parameter tuning. The main parameter of
an SVM is its kernel, which is the function that finds sim-
ilarity scores in given data in higher dimensions, or simply
as mentioned before, makes the data linearly separable with-
out transforming the data. There are different kernels for
SVM and each has its hyperparameter. Another important
parameter in SVM is the regularization or penalty parame-
ter (C); this parameter controls the margin of the hyperplane
between classes. Higher C parameter helps to classify the
training data with more precision, however, it also leads to
overfitting. In our study, we trained the network using poly-
nomial and Gaussian kernels with different degrees. The best
result obtained by using the polynomial kernel with degree
2 and the regularization parameter (C) set to 100. In each
training iteration, the program randomly selects normalized
input data from the available training pool until the best re-
sult is achieved. After the training is done, the SVM is tested
against the test data to see the final result.
Fig. 2. SVM IDM block diagram.
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The training process for a small dataset such as ours
is less than a second on a notebook PC with Intel Core i7
7700HK CPU. This allows us to repeat the training with ran-
dom inputs from the entire pool as many times as needed to
get our desired performance which is about 99% on the ini-
tial test data. To further test the performance of the obtained
SVM, we integrated it into NS-2 for real-time performance
analysis in different setupswhich are presented in Sec. 5. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates a simplified diagram of the designed SVM
IDM.
5. Performance Analysis
To evaluate the functionality of our proposed SVM de-
tection module, we prepared different scenarios, which car-
ried out with the same tools that are mentioned in the previ-
ous section. The malicious vehicle does periodic drops and
delays from 200milliseconds to 1 second randomly. The per-
formance is measured in terms of average Precision (PR), Re-
call (RC) and Matthew’s Correlation Coefficient (MCC) [33]
for general binary classification measurements. During the
classification process, the IDM either detects the presence of
attack correctly, known as True Positive (TP) or sends a false
alarm out when there is actually no intrusion which is known
as False Positive (FP). In normal situations when there is no
intrusion, the system should not trigger any alarm, known as
True Negative (TN), hence, any other negative output where
there is an active intrusion in the network is considered to be
False Negative (FN). The mentioned performance measures
are calculated as shown in (1), (2) and (3):
𝑃𝑅 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 , (1)
𝑅𝐶 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 , (2)
𝑀𝐶𝐶 =
𝑇𝑃 × 𝑇𝑁 − 𝐹𝑃 × 𝐹𝑁√
(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁) (𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃) (𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃) (𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁)
.
(3)
The remaining performance metrics are Detection Rate
(DR) and False Alarm Rate (FAR) which are more important
for evaluating performance of intrusion detection in general,
and are calculated as shown below in (4) and (5):
𝐷𝑅 =
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 , (4)
𝐹𝐴𝑅 =
𝐹𝑁
𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑃 . (5)
Additionally, to compare the result of our proposed sys-
tem, we performed a separate simulation to depict the perfor-
mance comparison between our proposed system and other
available methods in the same environment.
The average measure is obtained by evaluating SVM
output in every one second for the entire duration of the sim-
ulation. We repeated every setup 50 times with each having
different vehicle traffic flow on the roads of the same map.
We decided to use a generic setup for the network simulation
parameters which are more commonly used in other simi-
lar studies. A complete list of configurations is available in
Tab. 1. In general, we designed three main scenarios with
different number of vehicles: 10, 30 and 50. Each of these
scenarios have five different setups with a varying number of
attackers. The number of malicious vehicles changes from
one to five, which are distributed randomly in themap. An ex-
tra scenario with 30 vehicles and 6 RSUs are used to compare
our proposed IDMwith the LDA and QDA detection systems
proposed by Alheeti et al. [11].
As mentioned in Sec. 3, each of the attacking vehicles
need to have a chance to be in the packet forwarding route to
be able to affect the transmission. For instance, in a scenario
with five malicious vehicles, when there is an ongoing attack
during the data transfer, it can be the effect of one or up to
five, attackers present in packet forwarding. When there is
such a condition, with one or more malicious vehicles af-
fecting the transmission, we expect positive output from our
proposed SVM IDM.
Apparently, due to the random mobility of VANET
nodes in the area, there are times when the two commu-
nicating vehicles are within range of each other and do not
need any PFN in between; or times when there are no mali-
cious vehicles in the area to fit into the routing table. In these
cases, there is no attack and therefore the output of the SVM
IDM should be negative. Therefore, in every simulation run,
there are both cases of the network being under attack or
performing normally.
The obtained average attack uptime in every setup is
shown in Tab. 2. As it is depicted, with an increase in the
number of vehicles, the average attack uptime decreases from
344 seconds for 10 vehicles to 271 seconds for 30 vehicles
and 247 seconds for 50 vehicles. It is due to the larger
proportion of the number of malicious vehicles to normal
vehicles, therefore, attackers have a better chance of affect-
ing the network, hence increasing the average attack uptime.
In addition, the increase in the number of attackers in every
category with a different number of vehicles, increases the
average attack uptime by letting malicious vehicles to have
a greater chance to be in the transmission area.
For analyzing the classification performance of our
SVM IDM, the proposed module takes normalized data in
every second and uses it as the input for the module. We
have the average results for PR, RC, and MCC from different
scenarios presented in Tab. 3. As it is visible, the average PR
and RC for all setups are depicting an excellent performance
above 99 %, with the only exception being the average PR
of 50 vehicles. MCC on average is observed to be close to
1, which means the classification results are consistent. The
average PR and RC values are around 98 to 99 % for the
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Number of Vehicles Number of Attackers Average1 2 3 4 5
10 228.18 324.20 360.26 390.62 415.9 343.83
30 165.78 260.08 291.04 315.54 325.1 271.51
50 145.86 241.02 262.42 283.48 304.1 247.38
Tab. 2. Average time (seconds) of JF nodes actively affecting the network in 1000 seconds simulations.
different number of vehicles. This shows that the SVM IDM
is scarcely affected by the number of vehicles in our study. In
term of the number of attackers in the simulation area, with
respect to the number of vehicles, the changes in both PR and
RC stay very much the same. Although it can be seen that in
presence of only one attacker in the system, PR and RC are
marginally lower than the other number of attackers. All of
the values are again between 98 % to slightly below 100 %.
The results for DR and FAR calculations are available
in Tab. 4. By looking at the average DR in the table, it is
apparent that the proposed IDM can precisely identify the
intruders with 99 % success rate. False alarm found to be
as low as under 1 %. This will greatly reduce the chance of
identifying genuine VANET nodes as intruders and ensures
their availability for consistent network packet routing.
To conclude the performance analysis, we compared
the SVM IDM to QDA and LDA methods to observe the
performance of detecting malicious vehicles with network
packet dropping behavior under different detection systems.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 provide the results of the comparison
between the mentioned systems. The performance measures
are in terms of DR, PR, and F-Score (6); the latter measure




𝑃𝑅 + 𝑅𝐶 . (6)
We can observe that the proposed SVM IDM method
with the select features can detect malicious vehicles much
more efficiently than the other two methods. It is followed
by LDA which provides better performance compared to the
more similar method, namely QDA. All of the mentioned
methods present PR above 90 % which means FP ratio is
low.
Fig. 3. PRandDRperformance comparison betweenSVMIDM,
LDA and QDA.
Fig. 4. F-Score performance comparison between SVM IDM,
LDA and QDA.
In terms of F-Score, SVM IDMandLDAprovide scores
more or equal to 0.9; and in the case of DR, only the SVM
IDM has a score above 90 %.
Another important issue when comparing classification
tools is computational complexity. As mentioned before,
SVM is highly efficient in terms of both training and predic-
tion or classification time. In terms of Big-O notation, the
training time has the time complexity of 𝑂 (𝑛 × 𝑚2 + 𝑚3) in
the worst case, and,𝑂 (𝑠×𝑛) for the classification time, where
𝑚 is the number of samples, 𝑛 is the number of features, and,
𝑠 is the number of support vectors [34]. LDA has similar
time complexity which is 𝑂 (𝑚 × 𝑛2 + 𝑛3) for training when
𝑛 < 𝑚 [35], and, 𝑂 (𝑛) for prediction. The computational
complexity of QDA is similar to LDA, however, it is less
efficient when the feature count is high. Hence, in terms of
computational efficiency all mentioned algorithms are rela-
tively lightweight and for a small dataset with small feature
space similar to this research the difference is negligible.
6. Conclusions and Future Works
A delayed or dropped message in critical situations is
a potential accident in VANET environments. Safety ap-
plications in VANETs can become much more efficient if
the OBU is able to identify the presence of such malicious
behaviors in the network and isolate the culprit. SVM is
a potent machine-learning tool with suitable classification
abilities and low resource consumption. In this paper, we
used a polynomial kernel of degree 2 for training our SVM
IDM for packet dropping and delaying DoS attack detection
in the VANET environment. The proposed system is then
verified by implementing the SVM IDM in the receiving
VANET node, which examines the average number of packet
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Number of Vehicles Number of Attackers Average1 2 3 4 5
10
PR (%) 99.76 99.73 99.75 99.77 99.74 99.75
RC (%) 99.00 99.12 99.25 99.20 99.20 99.15
MCC 0.9920 0.9915 0.9922 0.9916 0.9909 0.99
30
PR (%) 99.14 99.34 99.37 99.47 99.29 99.32
RC (%) 98.91 99.14 99.15 99.11 99.11 99.09
MCC 0.9883 0.9897 0.9896 0.9896 0.9881 0.99
50
PR (%) 98.27 99.15 99.03 99.12 99.24 98.96
RC (%) 98.89 99.25 99.15 99.30 99.34 99.19
MCC 0.9834 0.9895 0.9877 0.9890 0.9898 0.99
Tab. 3. Performance of SVM IDM in terms of PR, RC and MCC.
Number of Vehicles Number of Attackers Average1 2 3 4 5
10 DR (%) 99.93 99.87 99.86 99.86 99.82 99.87FAR (%) 1.00 0.88 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.85
30 DR (%) 99.83 99.77 99.74 99.75 99.66 99.75FAR (%) 1.09 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.91
50 DR (%) 99.70 99.73 99.66 99.65 99.67 99.68FAR (%) 1.11 0.75 0.85 0.70 0.66 0.81
Tab. 4. Performance of SVM IDM in terms of DR and FAR.
drops, end-to-end delay, and hop-counts in every one sec-
ond interval to identify the possible intrusion. We observed
that in every different VANET scenario the system is able to
classify the presence or absence of DoS attackers with high
PR and RC, averaging to 99 %. MCC is also very close
to 1, which means our trained SVM is very consistent with
the classification. Furthermore, the detection module has
a low FAR to prevent harming the availability of the network
by false alarms and potentially eliminating genuine VANET
nodes. To further evaluate the performance of the SVM
IDM, we compared the proposed system with QDA and LDA
methods. This comparison depicted a better performance in
comparison to the other two methods in every criterion. This
proves a simple SVM with proper features and parameters
can be an effective tool as the core of the detection module
in an intrusion detection system. In our future works on
VANET security, we plan to expand our research to create
an IDS which is effective against more varieties of security
attacks in VANET.
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